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Abstract
This paper represents a contribution to the still meager literature on the impact of
prudential regulation bank behavior in Tunisia.  It aims to examine the effect of the
capital requirements on bank credits during the period from 1999 through 2010 and to
assess the effectiveness of the banking supervision policy in containing banking system’s
risk.  For this purpose a dynamic model is built and then an empirical regression is
estimated.  The results shows that regulatory capital framework has been binding bank
lending in Tunisia during the period of study; well-capitalized banks have lent more than
less-capitalized ones.  Despite the apparent stringency of the bank regulator in Tunisia,
banking supervision has been weakly effective in restraining banks’ overall risk.  Further
strengthening of the banking supervision policy is still needed on the part of the central
bank of Tunisia; i.e., the bank regulator.
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1. Introduction
Since they were first adopted by the authorities in 1991, there were few research
papers on prudential regulation, such as the capital requirements, and banks behavior in
Tunisia.  This paper is aiming to contribute to this literature by investigating the impact of
Basel I implementation on the Tunisian banking system.  We will examine the effect of
the regulatory capital ratio on bank risk-taking during the period from 1999 to 2010 and
assess the effectiveness of the banking supervision in containing this risk.
Throughout the 2000s, the Tunisian economy has been experiencing an
accelerated easing in the monetary policy (see figure 1) that aimed to enhance the still
insufficient growth of the real economy.  Notwithstanding, this period in which two
important reforms in banking regulation have been implemented by the government1, it
represents a more suitable time span to study the effect of the Basel regulatory capital
ratio on banks behavior than before.  In fact, it is conjectured that, during this period,
Tunisian banks have become more accustomed with this internationally-inspired
regulatory framework after its official implementation during the 1990s.  Therefore, the
examination of the banking supervision policy implemented by the bank regulator; i.e.,
the central bank of Tunisia, is expected to provide more interesting policy implications
for policy makers.  One of these policy issues might be institutional related to the design
of the banking regulator with respect the the monetary policy authority; the issue of the
combination of both functions by the same institution, i.e., the central bank of Tunisia ?
Outwardly, there does not appear any sign of a credit crunch during the period
between 1999 and 2010 as it was the case in many countries after their adoption of the
capital adequacy ratio regulation.  Indeed, throughout this decade, bank credits have not
ceased to increase steadily (see figure 2).
1 Law 2001-65 on Lending Institutions and the central bank of Tunisia Law 2006-26.
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Hence the questions that this paper aims to find some insights about are the
following: Did the capital regulatory framework have any binding effect on bank credits ?
In other words why there was no credit crunch in Tunisia like in other countries ? How
effective the bank supervisor was, in containing the banking system’s risk ?
The rest of the paper paper is organized as follows.  The next section presents a
literature review on capital regulation and its effect on bank behavior in several countries
such as Tunisia.  Section 3 exhibits the model which will represent the theoretical
framework of the empirical work.  This model is based on a micro-foundation analysis.
Section 4 discusses the assumptions on which the empirical regression is determined.
Section 5 presents the data and the related assumptions.  Section 6, the results and the
contribution of the paper are reported followed by several robustness tests.  Section 6
concludes the paper and some policy implications are derived. 
2. Literature Review
Since the commencement of the implementation of the capital measurement
system – commonly referred to as the Basle Capital Accord – by developed countries in
the early 1990s, many economists were interested in the impact of the Risk-Based
Capital Requirement and other types of regulatory capital standards on the banking
behavior, particularly lending.  The underlying hypothesis tested is whether the pressure
to meet the capital adequacy requirements could constrain banks from granting new loans
as issuing new equity involves costs associated to the asymmetric information between
investors and banks.  The binding capital requirement applied on banks could cause a
credit crunch and therefore harm seriously the real economy.
Bernanke et al. (1991) work constitutes a cornerstone paper in the credit crunch
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empirical literature.  In their paper, they defined the credit crunch phenomenon as “A
significant leftward shift in the supply curve for bank loans, holding constant both the
safe real interest rate and the quality of potential borrowers”
Bernanke et al. find evidence in favor of a capital crunch occurrence in the U.S.
in the early 1990s.2 They argue that the beginning-of-period level of capital ratio was
more stringent on the lending by small banks than large banks. 
Peek and Rosengren (1995a) argue that the formal regulatory actions, such as
capital requirements, have played a key role in the credit crunch of the early 1990s in
New England.  Using a simple static model, Peek and Rosengren (1995b) provide
evidence that capital-constrained and unconstrained banks react differently to the changes
in the federal funds rate.  A major implication of their findings is that the financial
situation of the banking sector should be taken into account by the monetary
policymakers.  In a third paper, Peek and Rosengren (1995c), in order to limit the effect
of the loan demand shocks, adopt an interesting approach that consists in focusing on
deposits (liabilities) rather than loans (assets) to test the capital crunch hypothesis.  The
authors find evidence of a capital crunch by obtaining a strong positive relationship
between a bank’s capital shock and the growth rate of its deposits.  Peek and Rosengren
insist on the need of a greater appreciation of the macroeconomic impact of the bank
regulatory policy.
Conversely, Berger and Udell (1994) found that the Risk-Based Capital ratio
(henceforth, the RBCR)3 does not explain much of the credit supply between 1990 (first
quarter) and 1992 (second quarter).  According to these authors, the reduction in loan
demand is primarily responsible for the observed fall in bank credits in the U.S. during
the mentioned period.  The one important methodological contribution, which
2 Expression first used by Richard Syron who was a member of the Federal Reserve Board’s monetary
policy committee 1989-1994.  In short capital crunch means a fall in bank capital.
3 The Basel ratio and the risk-based capital ratio are used interchangeably.
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differentiates their research work relatively to other papers, consists in including a
control period in order to determine definitive conclusions about the existence a credit
crunch.4 
Honda et al (1995) show that the capital requirement ratio affected Japanese major
banks’ lending behavior.  Woo (2003) and Watanabe (2007) the occurrence of a capital
crunch in 1997 confirms this result
Using an intertemporal model, Guizani (2013) argue that during the period from
1999 through 2005, a credit crunch was taking place in Japan.  Unlike the one occurred in
1997, this credit crunch is not attributed to a regulatory pressure but to a voluntary risk-
reduction policy followed by an increasingly risk-averse Japanese banking system.
Guizani (2013) points out that the major regulatory reforms implemented of the late
1990s, such as the prompt corrective action (the PCA) and the deposit insurance
measures that aimed to banking system’s distress of the mid-1990s, have reduced
regulator’s forbearance margin and reinforced banks’ self-discipline. 
Chiuri et al. (2002) examine a panel of data for 572 banks in 15 developing
countries and find consistent evidence that the capital regulation induced an aggregate
slowdown of bank credit.  Barajas and Steiner (2002) looked at eight Latin American
cases and report that, after Basel I has been introduced, banks switched the composition
of their balance sheets towards less risky assets.
With regard to Tunisia there are very few published literature about the impact of
Basel Accords on bank behavior.  Note that the capital adequacy ratio, recommended by
the Accords, has been implemented in Tunisia since 1996. Ben Naceur and Kandil
(2013) using a panel data on bank balance sheets in five MENA countries including
Tunisia, for the period from 1989 to 2003, examined the effect of the of the Basel I
implementation on credit growth.  Their panel model showed that Tunisian banks with
4 They define the credit crunch as a reduction in the credit supply relative to the normal supply.
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lower capital to assets ratio were able to expand more loans than well capitalized ones in
the period that followed the implementation of the capital adequacy regulation.  This
result shows a laxity of the banking supervisor in coping with reckless banks.  Boudriga
et al. (2012) working on MENA countries banking data from (2002 – 2006) find that the
capital adequacy ratio did not prevent banks from having high levels of delinquent loans.
However, they demonstrate the importance of the institutional environment, particularly a
sound regulatory quality, in reducing the percentage of bad loans in banks’ balance
sheets.
Ayadi et al. (2011), working on regulatory adequacy indices determined from the
Bank Regulation and Supervision Surveys (developed by Barth et al. (2001) and revised
in 2003 and 2007) conjecture that the soundness of capital capital adequacy ratios
throughout the 2000s in South-Med countries, such as Tunisia, is attributed to the
business models and the risk-aversion of the banking systems rather than the stringency
of the capital requirements.  Ben Naceur et al. (2011) note that improvements in
regulatory and supervisory bodies in the MENA region would enhance banks
performance. 
3. Model
The empirical framework in this paper will be based on the following micro-
foundation; where we build an intertemporal lending model of a representative banking
firm.  It is worth to mention that, according to Rochet (2008), in today’s banking activity
one–period models necessarily miss important consequences of bank solvency
regulations.  The intertemporal approach is widely adopted in the literature.5
This micro–foundation analysis reposes on the maximization of a regulatory–
5 From an econometric point of view, dynamic models have the advantage of keeping away the 
problem of simultaneity that we can face with static models.
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constrained profit function of a representative bank i.  The first order condition–derived
equation is then used to determine the loan–supply function.  The same approach has
been followed in Ogawa and Kitasaka (2000), Montgomery (2004) Montgomery and
Shimizutani (2007) and Guizani (2013).
The theoretical approach consists in the maximization of the profit function of a
bank i, under the subsequent two constraints:
1) The balance sheet identity.
2) The prudential regulation constraint.
3.1 Theoretical Framework
Consider a representative banking firm i that has the following balance sheet 
structure.  For simplification purposes, all balance sheet variables are converted to their 
logarithmic values:
Assets Capital and Liabilities
 Loans (L)
 Securities (S)
 Capital (K)
 Position in Money Market (M)
 Deposits (D)
Thus, we have at time t the following balance sheet identity,
Lt + St = Kt + Dt + Mt      t = 0….                    (1)
The bank i, is assumed to be risk–neutral and pursue a profit maximization
objective in a perfectly competitive credit market.  Therefore, the interest rate, rL, is
considered as given.  Moreover, the interest rates on the securities, rS, the deposits, rD, and
the money market, rC, are also assumed to be given.6
If the bank i is constrained by the prudential regulation, the following capital
constraint a la Kashyap and Stein (1994) applies:
6 The last argument is not illogical since interest rates on the money market are fixed by the Central
Bank.
6
tt KL                                                                                     (2)
Where:  is risk–based capital ratio (RBCR).
According to the balance sheet structure, the representative bank i’s revenue is 
composed by interest incomes on loans and securities:
rLt  Lt                                                                                         (3)
rSt  St                                                              (4)
In the other hand, the bank i is subject to the following costs:
a) Interests paid on deposits:  t
D
t Dr                                                                          (5)
b) Interests paid on the position on the money market:  rt
MM t                                (6)
c) Cost of default on loans: ttL                                                                               (7)
The theta, t , is the percentage of defaults on loans that depends on some
macroeconomic factors to be spelled out shortly below.7
d) Adjustment costs:8 It is assumed that the bank i’s adjustments costs have the 
following –quadratic–function
h
2
Lt - Lt-1( )
2
                                                                       (8)
Where: h > 0
Statement of the optimization problem:
The profit of the representative bank i is the discounted sum of the future net cash 
flows.  Hence, after taking into account equations (1) to (8), the profit function  
7 With a purpose of simplification it is assumed that bank i’s customers default on loans and not on 
interests’ income.  Therefore,  applies only on the stock of loans and not on the underlying amount of
interests.
8 In addition to interest cost there are several costs associated with banking activities.   Blackwell and
Santomero (1982) and Stanhouse (1983) argue that if banks want to issue loans to the general public,
then the banks must devote resources to the evaluation of the credit rating of the customer, as well, as
the administration and monitoring of the loan during its duration.  If there is a change in the amount of
the loans issued by the banks, then the banks need to adjust the amount of the resources allocated to
loan activities.
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becomes as follows:
p t= E b
i rt+i
L Lt+i + rt+i
S St+i( ) -
Dt+irt+i
D + rt+i
MM t+i +t+iLt+i
+
h
2
Lt+i - Lt+i-1( )
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Where:
i = 0…
Et[.]: mathematical expectation operator conditional on the information
available in period t.
b is the discount factor assumed to be equal one when i = 0
Replacing M by its expression, Mt = Lt + St – Kt – Dt, the profit function (9) is
then read:
p t= E b
i rt+i
L Lt+i + rt+i
S St+i( ) -
Dt+i rt+i
D - rt+i
M( ) + rt+iMLt+i + rt+iMSt+i - rt+iMKt+i +t+iLt+i
+
h
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Thus, the maximization of the bank i’s profit function  under the prudential
regulation constraint (2) can, mathematically, be stated as follows:
Maxp t= E b
i rt+i
L Lt+i + rt+i
S St+i( ) -
Dt+i rt+i
D - rt+i
M( ) + rt+iMLt+i + rt+iMSt+i - rt+iMKt+i +t+iLt+i
+
h
2
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tt KL 
The maximization of the profit function (10) subject to the prudential regulation
constraint (2), yields the following Euler equation:
   )  ) ttMtLtttt bhbhrrbhLbLb
bLE  +---+= +
1111
11
                        (11)
Where, t, is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the prudential regulation
constraint.
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4. Empirical Model
4.1 Assumptions
With the purpose to estimate the model in equation (11), several additional
assumptions have yet to be taken:
a – The cost of default on loans, , depends on some macroeconomic factors. In fact,
a recessionary business cycle exerts pressures on the corporate sector’s cash flows and
harms, consequently, its creditworthiness and ability to reimburse its debts and arrears. As
a result, the costs related to the default on loans jump during recessions.
According to the above analysis, the percentage of defaults on loans, , can be
formulated as a function of the business cycle.  To represent changes in business cycle the
GDP growth rate is employed.
For the sake of simplification, it is assumed that  is a linear function on GDP
growth rates:
t =
DGDP
GDP
æ
è
ç
ö
ø
÷
t
Where:  
0
÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ D

GDP
GDP

b – The Lagrange multiplier, , in the equation (11), per se, is not observable and
therefore must, for empirical purposes, be substituted by an observable proxy. The
unobservable variable, , is interpreted as the marginal increase of the bank i’s objective
function – i.e., the profit function – when the inequality constraint, KL  , is relaxed by
one unit.  The degree to which the inequality constraint is severe might be measured by
how distant the observed capital adequacy ratio is from the required level (either 8% or
4%).  It can be argued, hence, that as the risk–based capital ratio (the RBCR) goes
downturn, as the Lagrange multiplier t increases.  Consequently, this argument justifies
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the inclusion of the observable RBCR as a proxy of the unobservable (–t) in the equation
(11).
c – Finally, we assume that, on the basis of the information available in period t,
the bank i forms its expectations rationally.  Hence, the expected future lending level
E[Lt+1] can be substituted by the actual lending value Lt+1 and a forecast error term t+1; as
follows: E[Lt+1]= Lt+1+t+1
4.2 Regression
After considering the above-mentioned assumptions and rearranging the equation
(11), we obtain the following regression:9
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                 (12)
Where: 
b1 =
1
b ; bh
1
2 -=b
; bh

b 3
; bh
1
4 =b
; it is an error term10
All the other variables in the equation (12) are already defined earlier.
5. Data Set Description
The sample chosen comprises all commercial and healthy banks continuously
active between 1999 and 2010.  Distressed and newly created banks that lack sufficient
data are dropped from the sample.  Also development banks11 who changed their status to
9 When rearranging the equation (11), we use the following approximation: L it – Lit-1 ≈ (ΔL/L)it. Recall
that Lit is the natural logarithm of the total amount of loans of the bank I at time t.
10 It should be noted that the forecast error is uncorrelated with any variables contained in the bank’s
information set in period t under the rational expectation assumption.  This property is very useful in
solving the problems of endogeneity if the explanatory variables and especially the the simultaneity
between lending level and capital adequacy ratios.
11 Development banks are joint-venture banks between the Tunisian governments and other foreign
governments. Unlike conventional banks, development banks were aiming to provide long-run
finance.
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commercial banks during the period of study are not taken in the sample.
In addition, following Hovakimian et al. (2003), observations below the first or
above the ninety-ninth percentiles of all variables used in the estimation were dropped.
This sample trimming allows us to neutralize the effects of extreme values.
Merged banks are treated as one entity for the entire sample period.12 As a result,
the retained sample includes 13 banks (5 state-owned banks13 and 8 private banks)
representing about 72 percent and 81 percent of total banks assets in 1999 and 2010
respectively.  Table 1 exhibits the descriptive statistics of the sample data.  The data
contains a number of bank-observations between 152 and 156.  During the period of
study, the capital ratio mean of all banks was almost 14%; a ratio largely above the
required minimum of 8%.  However, the percentage of bad loans is quite high – with a
percentage mean of 18.6% during the period.  From 1999 until 2010, the economy has
been experiencing positive growth rates in real terms, though insufficient.
Data sources are the financial statements of the sample banks as published by the
Tunisian Professional Association of Banks and Financial Institutions (A.P.T.B.E.F.), the
Central Bank of Tunisia’s annual reports, and the World Bank country data.
6. Results
6.1. Baseline results
Tables 2 – column (1), provides the estimation results of the dynamic model (12)
for all viable banks during the sample period between 1999 and 2010.14
The estimation method employed is the general method of moments technique
(the GMM) as developed by Arellano and Bond (1991).  The list of instruments used in
12 Method employed by Peek and Rosengren in many of their research papers.
13The share of the state in Attijari Bank was sold to private shareholders in 2006.
14 The software used for the econometric estimation is Stata.
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the estimation include the lagged lending percentage changes; Δln(L), the lagged interest
rate differential; (rL – rM), the lagged risk–based capital ratio; the RBC ratio, and the
lagged GDP growth rate; the Δln(GDP).
The capital-adequacy ratio coefficient estimate has the expected positive sign and
is highly statistically significant in the regression.  This finding shows that, during the
period of study, lending decisions by Tunisian banks were constrained by capital
regulatory requirements.  Indeed, less–capitalized banks were more reluctant to grant new
loans than well–capitalized ones.  Obviously, few years after their official implementation
by the authorities, the capital regulation framework has started binding Tunisian banks
credits.
The coefficient estimate of the monetary policy variable, namely the interest rate
differential, (rL – rM), has theoretically the wrong positive sign but is highly significantly
different from zero.  Banks with higher interest rate margin have been lending more than
those with lower interest margin. 
Moreover, the estimations results point out that the lending behavior of Tunisian
banks does not depend significantly on business cycle but it does depend positively and
significantly on past realizations.  This conservative behavior of the Tunisian financial
institutions might explain the high percentage of accumulated non-performing loans in
their balance sheets.
Overall, these findings suggest that, during the period from 1999 to 2010, bank
lending in Tunisia was driven principally by supply-side factors rather than demand-side
factors.15
However these results should be read with caution. In fact, despite the
constraining effect of the regulatory capital framework, bank credits did not stop rising
steadily during the period; during the ten-year period of study, the total amount of
15 This finding contradicts Naceur and Kandil (2013) who attribute lending behavior of Tunisian banks
during the period (1989 – 2003) to demand fluctuations related to the real growth and cost of
borrowing.
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Tunisian bank loans has more than doubled (see figure 2).
Thus, two important questions remain to be investigated further and to which the
current findings can but only give a partial answer.  These questions are the following: Is
this apparently prudent lending behavior on the part of Tunisian banks, the result of, a
stringent banking supervisor (i.e., the central bank of Tunisia) or a voluntary risk-
reduction behavior? If the former is true, how efficient was the banking supervision
stringency in retraining risk?
6.2. Stringent banking supervision or a voluntary risk-reduction behavior on the
pat of Tunisian banks ?
 Even though, bank lending in Tunisia did not stop rising during the 2000s, the
regulatory minimum capital ratio (RBCR) did have, to certain extent, a disciplining effect
on banks’ risk-taking.
In this section we will investigate further this issue by examining whether this
prudent behavior is the result of a strict banking supervision or merely a voluntary risk-
reduction behavior on the part of increasingly risk-averse banks.  In fact, according to the
literature, the capital-adequacy ratio can mirror both attitudes.16 
To do this test, we add a new variable to the model; i.e. The lagged percentage of
the non-performing loans in total loans.  It is expected that as the non-performing ratio in
the balance sheet of a bank increases as the regulator becomes stricter and more careful in
supervising this bank. Usually, in such a case, the Tunisian central bank (i.e., the banking
supervisor) proceeds to an in-site supervision in addition to its regular off-site
supervision.
After introduction of the non-performing loans in equation (12), the regression
becomes as follows:
16 Wagster (1999).
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Where: 
NPL: the percentage of the non-performing loans in total loans
The estimation results are shown in table 2, column (2).  The capital-adequacy
ratio coefficient keeps its positive sign and is still highly statistically significant,
confirming therefore the findings in the previous section.  The non-performing loans
coefficient has the right theoretical negative sign and is highly statistically significant.
The more a bank holds delinquent loans, the less it is willing to lend.
This result demonstrates that the bank supervisor was to a certain extent stringent
during the period between 1999 and 2010.  This stringency might extend not only to non-
performing loans alone but undoubtedly to other prudential regulation standards such as
the capital-adequacy requirements.  This finding contradicts, to some measure, a
conjecture made by Ayadi et al. (2011) who attributed the soundness of south
mediterranean banks to only their risk-averse business-model.  Notwithstanding, we
cannot entirely deny the voluntary risk-reduction behavior on the part of Tunisian banks,
our findings provide strong evidence in favor of a banking supervision stringency.  This
finding represents a contribution of this paper to the literature.
The lagged GDP growth rate coefficient is now weakly significantly positive.  The
lagged lending change coefficient is still positive and significant.  However, the interest
rate margin coefficient is positive but no longer statistically significant. 
These results reaffirm further that during the period between 1999 and 2010 bank
lending pattern in Tunisia was to a large-scale driven by supply-side factors rather than
demand-side factors.  Tunisian bankers were to a certain extent taking into account their
financial soundness and the quality of their balance sheet when making their lending
14
(13)
decisions.  This precautionary behavior was made possible by a stringent supervisory
policy from the regulator; i.e., the central bank of Tunisia.
However, it is important to note that this stringent supervisory policy is manifestly
not sufficiently effective.  In fact, in the light of the international standards, the
percentage of non-performing loans is still judged very high (a percentage of two digits,
see figure 3).  This evidence reveals that despite the empirical proofs backing its
stringency, the supervision policy is noticeably weakly effective during the period of
study and further diligence is still needed from the central bank in this issue. Note that
the IMF has requested in many occasions the Tunisian authorities to reinforce their
banking supervision framework in order to reduce the burden of the banking system’s
delinquent assets.
6.3. Robustness Tests
In order to test the robustness of our results, the following robustness tests are
implemented.  The first test is a replication of Bernanke et al. (1991) approach and the
second one is a time effect approach.
6.3.1. Bernanke at al. (1991) approach
We follow the same approach as in Bernanke et al. (1991) by, basically, using
their model.  For the banking supervision stringency test, we will add, in a second
regression, the non-performing loans variable in order to fit the model to our empirical
needs.  The results are reported in table 3.  The findings are qualitatively similar to our
baseline results.  In both regressions, the RBCR coefficient is positive and highly
statistically significant, confirming consequently the binding effect of the regulatory
capital ratio on credits.  In the second regression, the nonperforming loans coefficient is
negative and highly significant suggesting that the central bank was to certain extent
following a strict banking supervision.  The Bernanke et al. approach does not show a
highly significant role of business cycles in shaping banking lending in Tunisia; the GDP
15
growth rate coefficient in both panel regressions is either insignificant or weakly
significant.
The Bernanke et al approach endorse our findings and shows that, during the
period between 1999 and 2010, bank credits in Tunisia were mainly driven by supply-
side factors rather than demand-side factors. 
6.3.2. Additional robustness test
We conduct an additional test to check the soundness of our baseline results.  For
this purpose, we include in the dynamic models (12) a dummy variable for each year of
the period of study so as to check whether the positive and significant coefficient of the
capital adequacy ratio captures unobservable shocks affecting all banks’ risk-taking
throughout the period.
Table 4, column (1), reports the results; overall, the findings are qualitatively
unaltered; the capital-adequacy ratio keeps its positive and highly statistically significant
coefficient.  
When we include the time effect dummy variable in model (13), the results, as
reported in table 4 – column (2) are generally unaltered; the RBCR coefficient is still
highly positively significant showing a tightening role of capital ratio regulation in bank
lending.  However, the nonperforming loans coefficient become not significantly different
than zero.
Note that the ABC bank data during the period have a relatively wider standard
deviations than other banks especially in the main variables’ data such as the percentage
change in lending and the capital adequacy ratio.  Fearing the inclusion of these data
would compromise the consistency of the baseline results, we run the regressions above
without the ABC bank data in order to test their robustness. The findings are qualitatively
unaltered.
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7. Conclusion
This paper represents a contribution to the weak literature on banking regulation
in Tunisia.  It examines the impact of the capital regulation on lending behavior during
the period between 1999 and 2010.  The empirical investigation provides evidence of a
constraining effect of the capital adequacy ratio framework on bank credits.  The more a
bank’s capitalization is sound and its assets are healthy, the more it is able to grant new
loans.  The effect of Basel capital regulation was extensively made possible by a stringent
supervision policy on the part of the bank regulator; i.e., the central bank of Tunisia. 
However, this finding should be taken with caution.  Notwithstanding, the
Tunisian regulator was to certain extent strict, this stringency can only be qualified as
weakly effective.  In fact, and in the light of the international standards, the percentage of
non-performing loans in Tunisian banks' balance sheets has been persistently high  during
the period of study.  This fact points out the need for a further reinforcement of the the
banking supervision policy in order to improve significantly the quality of the banking
system’s assets.  Macroeconomic objectives are most likely behind this supervisory
forbearance on the part of the regulator.  This policy might be beneficial when applied for
a short period and during recessions, however, if it is kept for a longer time it would
burden heavily the banking system with the accumulating unpaid credits.  Being in the
same time a monetary policy authority and a banking supervisor, the central bank of
Tunisia has, obviously, missed making a good balance of both policies.  This is likely
because of its focus on short-run real economy objectives. 
A tolerance of a high level of non-performing loans would put the banking system
at a persistent threat of a systemic risk which consequently would have long run negative
impacts on the economy as a whole and inevitably on taxpayers money.  Would a
separation of the banking supervision function from the central bank of Tunisia be a good
17
idea to solve this seemingly conflict of interests between the two missions; i.e., banking
regulation and monetary policy ? This interesting question would be a good topic for
future researches.
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Figure 1. Monetary Policy and Prices (quantity of money M1 and CPI) in Tunisia
(1982 – 2010)
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Figure 2. Loans, Capital and Total Assets (2000 – 2011)
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Figure 3. Percentage of Non-performing loans (average)
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics (1999 – 2010)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Lending percentage 
change
152 0.104 0.111 -0.187 0.638
Interest rate differential 156 0.022 0.026 -0.034 0.142
Capital Adequacy Ratio 152 0.138 0.076 0.018 0.751
Percentage of non-
performing loans
156      0.1862 0.0475 0 0.274
GDP growth rate 156 0.046 0.013 0.018 0.063
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Table 2. Dynamic Model 
Lending change (ΔL/L)
GMM
(1)
GMM
(2)
Lagged lending change (ΔL/L) 0.2027**(0.0846)
0.1562*
(0.0852)
Lagged interest rate differential (rL – rM)
2.8844**
(1.1605)
1.9200
(1.1947)
Lagged capital adequacy ratio (RBCR)
1.1489***
(0.3365)
1.3709***
(0.3420)
Lagged GDP growth rate (ΔGDP/GDP)
0.4809
(0.4664)
0.8980*
(0.4821)
Lagged percentage of non-performing loans (NPL/L)
-0.6317***
(0.2183)
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Table 3. Panel-Random Effect Model 
Lending change (ΔL/L) RE RE
Constant
0.01953
(0.0392)
0.1203***
(0.0436)
Lagged capital adequacy ratio (RBCR)
0.8015***
(0.2106)  
1.0753***
(0.2072)
Lagged GDP growth rate (ΔGDP/GDP)
-0.5192
(0.6069)
0.4094
(0.6080)
Lagged percentage of non-performing loans (NPL/L)
-0.9448***
(0.2207)
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Table 4. Dynamic Model With Dummy Variables
Lending change (ΔL/L)
GMM
(1)
GMM
(2)
Lagged lending change (ΔL/L) 0.2623***(0.0889)
0.2634***
(0.0894)
Lagged interest rate differential (rL – rM)
2.1163*
(1.1067)
2.1461*
(1.1125)
Lagged capital adequacy ratio (RBCR)
0.9165***
(0.3273)
0.8916**
(0.3509)
Lagged percentage of non-performing loans (ΔNPL/NPL)
0.0467
(0.4190)
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